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Abstract
Tax authorities around the world often are reluctant to disclose audit policy de-
tails. In particular, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has the practice of releasing
broad statistics like the audit rate of each income class but resists pressures demand-
ing details on how di¤erent circumstances might result in a higher audit probability
to taxpayers. This paper experimentally examines whether disclosing such details can
reduce tax compliance. We compare a Flat-rate treatment, where taxpayers are told
about the average audit probability, with a Bounded treatment, where taxpayers are
fully informed of the contingent audit probability structure. Our ndings do not sup-
port the potential concern against disclosing details. In an additional Bounded-hi-q
treatment where multiple equilibria exist, the compliance level is even higher under
full disclosure of the probability structure.
JEL codes: H26, M42, C9, C72
Keywords: Information disclosure, Government transparency, Audit policy, Tax
auditing, Tax compliance, Laboratory experiment
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1 Introduction
This paper asks whether more transparency in government agencies compromises their com-
missioned objectives. Specically, we study the impact of information disclosure, concerning
audit policy details, by a tax authory like the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the
level of tax compliance. IRS has long been accused of having a secret culture(see Saxon
(1994), Johnston (1995b), and Davis (1997)).1 While the agency is not as opaque as before,
what people know about IRS audits is still mainly from broad statistics provided on its web
site (e.g., from the IRS Data Books).2 Even though, following the enactment of the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, the agency has made public the Internal Revenue
Manual (IRM) describing the tax audit process (Gates (2000)), certain details of the audit
policy remain undisclosed to taxpayers.3
Why does IRS disclose only broad statistics like the audit rate of each income class but
not details of the audit policy? Apparently, the agency worries that the tax compliance
level would fall should taxpayers know details of the audit policy (New York Times (1981a)
and New York Times (1981b)). In this paper, we investigate whether a tax authority could
1For example, the [US] Governments chief keeper of historic records said [on 20 December 1995] that
the Internal Revenue Service has, for at least two decades, violated Federal laws that require it to identify
signicant documents and turn them over to the National Archives. ... John W. Carlin, the Archivist of the
United States, gave the I.R.S. 90 days to come up with a plan to identify, safeguard and eventually turn over
to his o¢ ce records that may have historic value. His 50-page evaluation cited "serious shortcomings" in
I.R.S. record-keeping and questioned whether some important records had been lost or destroyed. "Numerous
records that document both policy-making and high-prole programs" either are not scheduled to be released
to the National Archives "or have not been located and identied," the evaluation said. ... Critics have long
accused the I.R.S. of excessive secrecy, and historians, individual taxpayers and others have battled for access
to statistical data.(Johnston (1995b))
2Documentation of IRS audit practices in the academic literature is sparse. An example is Pentland and
Carlile (1996).
3Evidence for this is not hard to nd. For example, the actual operation of the discriminant function
(DIF) formula used to identify the most suspicious tax returns for follow-up remains a closely guarded
secret (Jones (2001)). It seems that IRS has released the entire IRM on its web site. But a careful
look at the web manual shows that the section IRM 4.19.1.2.6, Form 1040 Individual Returns Scored
by DIF System (Audit Code Denitions) is missing (see the Table of Contents of Part 4 of the IRM at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/index.html). According to IRM 4.1.3.2.2, the missing section contains Audit
Codes used to identify returns delivered [directly] to Examination as Automatics for manual screening,
regardless of the DIF scores. Apparently, IRS wants to keep the information secret.
Thoroughly searching over the web IRM can locate partial information about the Codes, e.g., in Exhibit
3.11.3-5. However, like multiple places of the section IRM 3.11.3 Individual Income Tax Returns (e.g., Exhibit
3.11.3-8 Examples of Reasonable Causes and Exhibit 3.11.3-6 Unallowable Codes), some details have been
overwritten with equal signs (=). Similar blacked-outs can be found in other IRS documents released to the
public, e.g., pages 3-4, 3-8, 3-14, and 3-15 of the 2010 version of IRS Processing Codes and Information
(IRS (2010)).
1
Wi
thd
raw
n b
y t
he
 au
tho
r
You can find a newer version here: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31160/
be no worse o¤ by fully disclosing to taxpayers the structure of an audit policy, instead of
merely telling them the average audit probability. Answering this question is important. It
can provide evidence to support the information-withholding position of IRS, or otherwise
give some assurance to the agency to become more transparent, as critics have demanded,
without compromising the objective to increase tax compliance.
The tension between increasing government transparency and keeping appropriate levels
of secrecy is not new (Ginsberg (2011)). Watchdog organizations like OMB Watch, Citizens
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, First Amendment Coalition, and Taxpayers for
Common Sense always press for more transparency and freedom of information. However, the
demand for government transparency has never been stronger (Ornstein and Limor (2011)).
Since Barack Obama was elected as the US President, the administration has emphasized
the committment to creating an unprecedenteded level of openness in Government(Obama
(2009)). As a result of the Open Government Initiative, agencies are asked to increase
disclosures (see, e.g., Department of the Treasury (2011)). Still, censorship of information
prior to release is not unheard of (The Associated Press (2011)).
As for IRS, the reluctance to disclose information has not changed much in the last four
decades.4 The reservation is not only on open disclosure to the public but also on condential
4In 1973, Ralph Nader of Tax Reform Research Group invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
in order to obtain some IRS documents. The agency refused and Nader responded with a suit before IRS
reluctantly agreed to provide the documents (Time (1974)). A year before this, Susan Long and her husband
started the litigation lasting for over 15 years, involving courts as high as the US Supreme Court, forcing the
agency to be more open in releasing information. Their rst successful legal action set the principle that
the I.R.S. could not withhold information like statistics on the audit rates for taxpayers in di¤erent income
groups, nor its basic operating manual.(Saxon (1994)).
It was thought that the nearly two decades of litigation nally came to an end when IRS was ordered to
pay the Longs legal fees in 1991. But the battle reopened in 2004 when IRS told Susan Long that after
extensive research, its lawyers concluded that no court order existed and accordingly, the I.R.S. is not in
violation of any standing injunctions by withholding information from her (Johnston (2006)). In 2006,
Long went to court again to le a legal motion to require the agency to comply with prior court orders to
turn over detailed data on its audit practices (Johnston (2006)). On 13 June 2008, the US District Court in
Seattle granted her motion. IRS timely appealed the order. Finally, on 16 September 2010, the US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit a¢ rmed in part and reversed in part the 13 June 2008 order, ruling that
some information taken from IRSs Form 5344 of one particular taxpayer, referred to as cells of one, is
condential under 26 U.S. Code Section 6103(b) (United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(2010)).
Long was not the only one in battle with IRS for information disclosure in recent years. For example,
Tax Analysts, the nonprot publisher of Tax Notes magazine, went to court for obtaining e-mail messages
in which tax auditors in the eld were given advice on how to apply the law. We won a unanimous court
of appeals decision that they cant hide this stu¤,Tax Analystspresident said, but instead of complying
with the order to produce it, they are playing games.(Johnston (2008)).
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disclosure to researchers (see, e.g., Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), page 375). Intrigued by
the puzzling attitude of IRS, we are interested in verifying whether disclosing audit policy
details necessarily reduce tax compliance, or maybe it could actually increase compliance.
Laboratory tightly controls many factors that may a¤ect behaviors. It also allows mea-
suring certain personal characteristics, e.g., risk aversion level, that might be important to
explaining behaviors but hard to measure outside laboratory. For these and other reasons,
randomized experiments in laboratory are not subject to various limitations of observa-
tional experiments (Rosenbaum (2002)). Randomized experiment therefore o¤ers an excel-
lent methodology for us to answer the research question without worrying about confounding
e¤ects that might arise from using archival data.
Consistent with IRSs practice of disclosing only broad statistics like the audit rate of
each income class, prior experimental studies on tax compliance usually consider settings
where subjects are told to be audited independently at a known, constant probability (e.g.,
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974), Moser et al. (1995), Zimbelman and Waller
(1999), Boylan and Sprinkle (2001), Kim et al. (2005), Kim and Waller (2005), Alm et al.
(2009), and Kleven et al. (2011)). A recent theoretical study shows that such a at-rate
audit rule in equilibrium has the same deterrence e¤ect as a variable-rate rule, referred to
as the bounded rule (Yim (2009)).
Simply put, the bounded rule fully utilizes a given audit capacity to randomly select
a sample of equally suspicious reports to check if the number of such reports exceeds the
capacity, or otherwise audits all of such reports. Because the number of reports selected
for audit is bounded by the audit capacity, the audit probability facing a taxpayer varies
depending on the total number of suspicious reports led by the taxpayer population. By
setting the audit capacity appropriately, the compliance level induced by the bounded rule
can be equivalent to that by the at-rate rule. This theoretical equivalence together with
the simple binary-income setting from which the bounded rule was derived makes comparing
the two rules experimentally using human subjects a suitable way to answer our research
question.
In designing our experiment, we bear in mind the Why People Pay Tax(WPPT) puzzle
documented in the tax compliance literature (Alm et al. (1992)). It is unclear why most
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people le tax returns honestly when the average audit probability is only 1% (Slemrod
(2007)). Given this phenomenon, it is important to ensure that our experiment provides
a su¢ cient incentive to lie. Otherwise, if nearly all participants behave honestly in our
experiment, the result would bias toward a no di¤erenceconclusion. To avoid this bias,
the baseline Flat-rate treatment of our experiment provides a strong enough incentive for
participants to lie. It is so strong that theoretically all participants should lie, just like the
key feature of the documented puzzle. However, also like the puzzle, the actual outcome is
a compliance level much higher than 0%.
To compare with the Flat-Rate treatment that represents the practice of disclosing only
the average audit probability, our Bounded treatment lets participants know how the audit
probability is contingent on the total number of suspicious reports led by taxpayers. Like
the Flat-rate treatment, the Bounded treatment has a predicted compliance level of 0%. The
actual outcome, again, is far above the theoretical prediction.
We nd that compared to the Flat-rate treatment, the compliance level is not lower un-
der full disclosure of the contingent audit probability structure in the Bounded treatment.
Interestingly, it is actually higher in magnitude (43%, rather than 39% in the Flat-Rate treat-
ment), though not statistically signicant. Similar results continue to hold when conning
to the last 10 periods where participants should have become familiar with the environment
(47%, rather than nearly 42% in Flat-Rate). The ndings support our hypothesis that there
is no di¤erence in the compliance levels under the bounded and at-rate rules, which rep-
resent disclosing audit policy details (i.e., the contingent audit probability structure) versus
merely the average audit probability. We conclude that disclosing audit policy details does
not necessarily reduce tax compliance.
To see whether the conclusion might be sensitive to a parameter in the experiment, we
contrast the Bounded treatment with the Bounded-hi-q treatment. This additional treatment
captures the case where taxpayers in an area under the jurisdiction of an IRS District O¢ ce
are more likely to have a high income.5. When the parameter q is high, there are multiple
equilibria under the bounded rule in the tax compliance game of the experiment. One of the
5Consistent with the emphasis by Yim (2009), tax audits are administrated by IRS District O¢ ces under
audit capacity constraints. See further discussion in section 5.
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equilibria involves all high-income taxpayers tacitly coordinating to lie. Another involves all
of them reporting honestly. The third is a mixed equilibrium where each taxpayer randomizes
to lie with the same probabiltiy.
We nd that the conclusion from the rst two treatments is not sensitive to the existence
of multiple equilibria in the Bounded-hi-q treatment with a high q. We observe a higher
level of compliance in this treatment (66% overall and 74% for the last 10 periods) than in
both the Flat-rate and the Bounded treatment. We further conclude that fully disclosing the
audit probability structure, rather than merely the average audit probability, can increase
tax compliance, instead of reducing it.
Besides the main ndings above, we also analyze the audit budget implications of the
bounded rule to see whether they are broadly consistent with the theoretical insights of Yim
(2009) where the rule was derived. The results suggest that the bounded rule on average
conducts fewer audits than the at-rate rule. If taking into account the budget commitment
required to credibly implement the at-rate rule, the bounded rule has a higher budget usage
ratio than the at-rate rule. Both results are in line with the theoretical insights about the
bounded rule, suggesting no unexplained issue that might cause any concern.
Though consistent with the documented WPPT puzzle, the compliance levels observed in
the experiment are under-predicted quite substantially by the standard theory. This leads us
to conduct additional analyses to reconcile the discrepancy using alternative choice models
under uncertainty. The observed behaviors can be satisfactorily explained by a loss aversion
model. We are not aware of any unusual results from the analyses that might compromise
the conclusion of our main analysis.
This paper adds to the literature on understanding how dissemination of enforcement
information might a¤ect taxpayersbehavior (e.g., Slemrod et al. (2001)). Focusing on the
compliance impact of information dissemination regarding audit results, Alm et al. (2009)
nd that the e¤ect of post-audit information is conditional on whether the taxpayer is well
informed of the audit probability prior to ling. Unlike them, we do not consider disclosing
population-wide audit results of the previous period before the ling in a period. Instead, we
focus on the disclosure of the underlying contingent audit probability structure (Bounded),
which has a deterrence e¤ect theoretically equivalent to that of the average audit probability
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disclosed (Flat-rate). Alm et al. (2009) consider only the latter case to contrast with the
alternative of no disclosure at all.
Research in the disclosure literature has predominantly concentrated on corporate trans-
parency (e.g., Bushman et al. (2004) and Francis et al. (2009)). One of the main themes
is that companies with more disclosure might enjoy the benets from reducing information
asymmetry, namely a lower cost of capital, a smaller bid-ask spread, etc (e.g., Botosan and
Plumlee (2002)). This paper extends the literature to consider government transparency.
What motivates government agencieslack of transparency appears to be the potential ben-
ets from being opaque. Our ndings, however, suggest that a presumed benet might not
exist. Interestingly, there might even be some overlooked cost (in terms of foregone benet)
under certain circumstances (e.g., a high q).
Findings from accounting research suggest that investors do not fully exploit publicly
available information, nor fully understand the implications of the information, in mak-
ing investment decisions (e.g., Bartov et al. (2000), Dechow et al. (2008), and Landsman
et al. (2011)). Possible reasons include limited attention or other information processing or
transaction costs (e.g., Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Louis and Sun (2010), and Corwin and
Coughenour (2008); see also the discussion by Schipper (2007)). Consistent with such nd-
ings, our results suggest that maybe IRS has overly worried about the impact of disclosing
audit policy details.
To meet peoples increasing demand for transparency in government, IRS can set out a
plan to disclose more information about the audit policy on an annual basis. Each year
the incremental disclosure should be about a clearly dened set of new information and be
released on a specic date before the deadline of another round of tax return ling. This
way researchers can precisely analyze the impact of the incremental information disclosure.
Furher evidence can thus be provided to determine whether even more disclosure or IRSs
current position of information withholding should be supported. Ultimately, such research
may help IRS to understand how its commissioned objectives can be best fullled. The
unintended monitoring functions of IRS on the nancial market and nancial reporting
quality (see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), page 138, El Ghoul et al. (2011), and Hanlon
et al. (2011)) might also be enhanced.
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The organization of this paper is as follows. We describe the experiment design and
procedure in the next section, ending with our hypothesis for testing. Main results from
the experiment are discussed in section 3. In section 4, we conduct additional analyses to
reconcile the discrepancy between the actual compliance level observed in the experiment
and that predicted by the standard theory. Section 5 reviews related tax compliance studies
and further explains why we design the experiment based on the bounded rule. Section 6
contains concluding remarks. The theoretical analysis upon which our experimental study
is based, technical details and proofs, and the experiment instructions are provided in the
appendix.
2 Experiment and Hypothesis
2.1 Design
The tax compliance game in all treatments of our experiment has three stages: (i) income
reporting and tax deduction, (ii) audit and ne deduction, and (iii) feedback. Subjects receive
either a high income IH = e25 (H-type) or a low income IL = e10 (L-type) with probability
q or 1   q, respectively. Subjects are informed of the group size N and the probability q.
Based on the capacity constraint in the lab, the size of the taxpayer population is xed to
be N = 8. The parameter q is either 0:5 or 0:9 depending on the treatment.
During the income reporting stage, subjects have to decide simultaneously and indepen-
dently the report type (high income or low income) to submit to an auditor, which
is simulated by a computer. The computer automatically deducts taxes according to the
reported income. The tax for subjects reporting a high income is TH = e12.5, whereas
the tax for subjects reporting a low income is TL = e2.5.6 Subjects are told that taxes
are deducted based on their reported income instead of true income. For instance, if H-
type players submit a low-incomereport, they receive e22.5, instead of e12.5. Similarly,
6Experimental parameters concerning taxation are chosen to be in line with the reality. For instance,
the real-world tax rates for high-income and low-income taxpayers are usually dependent on the levels of
their incomes. In particular, many countries such as Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the USA
use a progressive tax system instead of a proportional one. Hence, this experiment adopts a progressive tax
system for the sake of facilitating subjectsunderstanding.
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L-type players receive  e2.5, instead of e7.5, if they submit a high-incomereport.7 In
the audit stage, the computer implements either a at-rate rule or a bounded rule to audit
low-incomereports submitted. In the experiment, high-incomereports are not audited.
This is consistent with the IRM guidelines (see section 5 for further details).
Described below are the designs of the three treatments of the experiment. Key parameters
of the treatments are summarized in Table 1.
Flat-rate: In this treatment, subjects are told that those ling low-income reports
independently face an audit probability of a = 0.4. This audit probability induces the same
compliance rate as the bounded rule does with an audit capacity K = 2.8 If subjects report
honestly, nothing will happen to their nal payo¤s. If cheaters are caught by the auditor,
they need to pay back the e10 of taxes evaded plus a ne of F = e10.
Bounded: In this treatment, the ne for cheaters is exactly the same as in the Flat-rate
treatment. The audit probability, however, depends on the total number of low-income
reports received. The maximum number of audits to be conducted is K = 2. This value of
the parameter guarantees a unique Nash equilibrium based on non-cooperative game theory
(see the theoretical analysis provided in the appendix for details). Setting K = 2 means
that if the number of low-income reports does not exceed two, then all of them will be
audited with probability 1. Otherwise, the audit probability decreases monotonically with
the number of low-income reports, denoted by L. In particular, the probability is 0.67
for L = 3; 0.5 for L = 4; 0.4 for L = 5; 0.33 for L = 6; 0.29 for L = 7; 0.25 for L = 8.
Instead of merely disclosing the average audit probability, the contingent audit probability
structure is fully disclosed to subjects through an audit probability table (see the experiment
instructions provided in the appendix for details).
Bounded-hi-q: Except for the ex-ante probability q of receiving a high income, this
treatment is the same as the Bounded treatment. The high q = 0.9 of this treatment
represents the case of an area under the jurisdiction of an IRS District O¢ ce where taxpayers
7Even when a subject with a low income makes a loss by submitting a high-incomereport and that
decision is selected for payment, the potential loss is covered by a show-up fee of e3. During the experiment
sessions, this situation never actually happens.
8Because the at-rate rule induces all-or-none behavior in compliance, such a rule with an audit proba-
bility a < 0:5 theoretically has the same deterrence e¤ect as the bounded rule, assuming the standard setup
with perfectly rational, risk-neutral players.
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are more likely to have a high income. Compared to the Bounded treatment, subjects lying
in this treatment face a higher degree of uncertainty because fewer low-incomereports will
be submitted given the low probability of having low-income taxpayers. Consequently, there
will be fewer honest low-incomereports to pool with lying low-incomereports, making
lying easier to be detected by audits. The theoretical analysis provided in the appendix
shows that the game in this treatment has multiple equilibria. We are interested in knowing
whether the behavior observed in the Bounded treatment is sensitive to the presence of
multiple equilibria under the bounded rule when q is high.
2.2 Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of a European university from October to
December 2009. Most of the university students participating as subjects in the experiment
were major in economics or business. The experiment instructions, provided in Appendix
C.2, were modied from those in prior tax compliance studies, namely Alm et al. (2009), Kim
et al. (2005), and Kim and Waller (2005). We used Z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)) to
program and conduct the experiment.
Each treatment of the experiment consists of four sessions; each session has 16 subjects.
The duration of a session is about 1 hour (including the initial instruction and nal payment
to subjects). The average earnings are e16.23 (including the e3 show-up fee). At the begin-
ning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned to the computer terminals. Before the
experiment starts, subjects have to complete an exercise making sure that they understand
the rules of the tax compliance game.
The game consists of 30 periods. At the beginning of each period, 16 subjects are randomly
allocated into two groups of eight. The random re-matching protocol minimizes the chances
that subjects encounter the same group of participants again. The purpose is to simulate a
one-shot scenario but allows the subjects to be familiar with the game environment. This is
particularly important for treatment sessions with the bounded rule. Each period can thus
constitute a new observation of a one-shot game, rather than a snapshot of a multiple-period
dynamic game. At the end of each period, a summary screen is presented to subjects with
feedback information including the subjects true and reported income, and the nal payo¤
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for the period. Subjects are not informed of otherspayo¤s.
Upon nishing the tax compliance game part of the experiment, subjects are asked to
complete a risk elicitation task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2002). The
instructions for the risk elicitation task are handed out only after the tax compliance game.
Hence, the subjects are not aware of its existence beforehand. Details of this task can be
found in the experiment instructions. The task measures subjectsrisk aversion levels, which
could be useful in explaining their behaviors.
During the payment stage, one period of the tax compliance game and the realization of
one lottery of the risk elicitation task are randomly selected to determine the nal payment
to a subject. This random payment scheme mitigates the potential income e¤ect that the
subjects carry across di¤erent periods of the game and over to the risk elicitation task.
We conclude this section by stating the hypothesis for testing, which is based on the
prediction (Proposition 2) derived in the theoretical analysis given in the appendix.
Hypothesis 1 The underreporting rates in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments are the
same.
Because the game in the Bounded-hi-q treatment has multiple equilibria, we merely com-
pare the underreporting rate in the treatment with those in the other two without advancing
any hypotheses based on theoretical predictions.
3 Main Results
Figure 1 depicts the average underreporting rates across treatments. The dynamics in the
Flat-rate and Bounded treatments look similar. In contrast, the average underreporting rate
in the Bounded-hi-q is visibly lower and declines steadily over periods.
Table 2 summarizes the compliance behaviors and auditing statistics across experimental
treatments. The rst three columns contain averages over all 30 periods of play. The next
three columns are averages of the last 10 periods, where subjectsbehaviors are expected
to be more stable after becoming familiar with the environment. Statistical testing on
the treatement e¤ects is based on the two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We adopt the
10
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strictest standard to use each session as an independent observation. This avoids any doubt
that observations at more rened levels (e.g., by subject or by session-period) might not
be completely independent. Such doubt arises from the fact that unlike indivdual decision-
making experiments, subjects in our treatments under the bounded rule interact with each
other, rather than make their own independent decisions; moreover, their behaviors might
be correlated across periods.
We rst focus on the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments. The top panel of the table
reports statistics concerning all subjects. The rst row of the panel indicates that the actual
frequency of being an H-type in the two treatments is very close to the pre-specied levels.
The second row displays the percentage of low-incomereports out of all reports received
(i.e., the total number of reports from L-type players or lying H-type players, divided by 8).
The ratio is around 80% in the two treatments.
The middle and the bottom panels of the table provide data for testing our hypothesis
and examining the audit budget implications of the experiment results. Our ndings are
summarized as follows:
Result 1 Hypothesis 1 is supported. The di¤erence between the underreporting rates ob-
served in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments is statistically insignicant.
Support: The average underreporting rate is 60.83% in the Flat-rate treatment and 57.11%
in the Bounded treatment. A two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the underreporting rates of the two treatments are the same (p = 0:386). In
the last 10 periods, the magnitude of the di¤erence in underreporting rate becomes slightly
larger but still statistically insignicant (p = 0:564).
Result 2 The bounded rule is more cost-e¤ective in the sense that on average
(i) fewer audits are performed, and
(ii) the budget-usage ratio is higher
in the Bounded treatment than in the Flat-rate treatment.
Support: The di¤erence in the cheater detection rate, namely the frequency that a tax
cheater is caught during an audit stage, is not statistically signicant in both treatments
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(p = 0:113 for all 30 periods; p = 0:149 for the last 10 periods). This means that the
bounded and at-rate rules are equally e¤ectively in detecting cheaters.
Several pieces of evidence support that the bounded rule is more cost-e¤ective. Assuming
a constant cost per audit, we can use the number of audits performed in a treatment as
a proxy for the audit resources consumed to achieve the compliance level observed. Both
the total and the average number of audits performed are signicantly lower in the Bounded
treatment (p < 0:05).
We also look at the audit selection rate, which is dened as the proportion of low-
incomereports selected for audit, out of the total number of such reports received. This
rate is signicantly lower in the Bounded treatment, both for all 30 periods or only the last
10 periods (p < 0:05). These results suggest that auditing with the bounded rule can achieve
the same compliance level at a lower cost.
Finally, we look at the budget usage ratio, which is dened as the percentage of audit
resources actually used, out of the budget commitment required to credibly support an
audit rule. The ratio is 100% in the Bounded treatment, which means that all resources
committed are used at the full capacity in each period (i.e., two audits). Under the at-rate
rule, the budget-usage ratio is only 32%. The ine¢ ciency is due to the fact that in order to
credibly implement the at-rate rule, the auditor must have the resources to be ready to do
all eight audits in each period. However, much fewer audits are actually carried out.
In an equilibrium setting, Yim (2009) has analytically shown that even when the at-
rate rule can be implemented using large-sample random sampling, the budget usage ratio
remains substantially below that of the bounded rule. Unfortunately, we cannot assess
this theoretical insight with our experiment because the size of the experimental taxpayer
population is only eight subjects.
The following is our result from the Bounded-hi-q treatment.
Result 3 The underreporting rate is signicantly lower in the Bounded-hi-q treatment than
in the Bounded and Flat-rate treatments. The higher compliance level is achieved with sig-
nicantly fewer audits performed and with a higher budget-usage ratio.
Support: The average underreporting rate in the Bounded-hi-q treatment is 33:95% over
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all 30 periods and 26:16% in the last 10 periods. The compliance level in this treatment
is the highest, as the underreporting rate is signicantly lower compared to the other two
treatments (p < 0:05). The di¤erence is already salient in the rst period and remains highly
signicant throughout the other periods of the game.
Regarding auditing statistics, the total number of audits performed is smaller in this
treatment than in the Bounded treatment (p < 0:05). However, the audit selection rate
turns out to be signicantly higher ( p < 0:05), owing to fewer low-incomereports received
given the higher q in this treatment. The cheater detection rate is remarkably higher as well
(p < 0:05). The budget-usage ratio is 95.63%, which is signicantly higher than that in the
Flat-rate treatment (32.03%).
4 Additional Analyses
While the main results discussed above have answered our research question concerning the
impact of disclosing audit policy details, the observed compliance levels remain unexplained
by the standard theory. In this section, we make an attempt to better understand individual-
level compliance behavior. The purpose is to ensure that we have not overlooked anything
that might lead to misinterpretation of the main results.
4.1 Stochastic Nature of Individual-level Behavior
Figure 2 displays the frequency distributions of the individual underreporting rate across
treatments. The horizontal axis represents a subjects individual underreporting rate, i.e.,
the percentage of times where the subject when assigned as a high-income taxpayer submits
a low-incomereport. The vertical axis represents the percentage of subjects with similar
underreporting rates in a treatment.
The main message conveyed by Figure 2 is that the standard theory has limited ex-
planatory power over the individual-level data of the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments.
Only 29.13% of the subjects in the Flat-rate treatment and 23.43% of those in the Bounded
treatment underreport whenever receiving a high income, behaving in accordance with the
standard theory. The percentage of seemingly intrinsically honest subjects, who always re-
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port their income truthfully, is 12.5% in the Flat-rate treatment and 15.63% in Bounded.
Even after correcting for the presence of seemingly intrinsically honest players, the standard
theory still underpredicts the compliance levels observed in the treatments.
Figure 2 also indicates that around 60 percent of the subjects switch between the two
options at various levels of frequency. This pattern is very similar in the two treatments
(Mann-Whitney test: p = 0:322). In contrast, the distribution of the underreporting rate
in Bounded-hi-q is signicantly di¤erent (Mann-Whitney test: p < 0:05). Throughout this
treatment, only about 7% of the H-type choose to submit low-income reports, whereas
33% of them honestly report a high income.
Recognizing the highly stochastic nature of individual-level behavior, we conduct addi-
tional analyses to better understand the behavior using several choice models under un-
certainty. Becasue the game in Bounded-hi-q has multiple equilibria and the compliance
behavior observed in the treatment appears to follow a di¤erent pattern, we focus on the
Flat-rate and Bounded treatments in our attempt to explain the stochastic component of
the behavior.
4.2 Choice Models under Uncertainty
The standard theory predicts that strategic players will always choose to submit low-
incomereports. On the other hand, intrinsically honest players will always report the type
of income they receive. In either case, the choices should be consistent across periods. In con-
trast, Figure 2 suggests that many participants in our experiment make stochastic choices,
which is consistent with McFaddens discrete-choice framework (McFadden (2001)).
This framework relaxes the perfect rationality assumption to accommodate boundedly
rational behavior. Models in this framework are motivated by empirical studies where ob-
served decisions exhibit some noise (see, e.g., Fischbacher and Stefani (2007), Loomes (2005),
Rieskamp (2008), and Wilcox (2011)). Such noise could come from observed sources like de-
cision errors. It could also arise from unobserved or unmodeled channels such as individual
perceptions of the game or sensitivity to payo¤ changes. The presence of such noise leads to
people making decision errors and hence behaving inconsistently with their choices.
The Flat-rate treatment is essentially a non-strategic choice-under-uncertainty problem for
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H-type players. Therefore, the classic individual discrete-choice model is a natural choice to
explain the stochastic individual behavior. The Bounded treatment introduces interactions
among subjects. A general way to incorporate decision errors into a strategic interaction
setting is the quantal response equilibrium rst proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
This equilibrium concept is based on McFadden (1973)s random utility maximization model
of the same framework.
Using the discrete-choice framework, we estimate and compare three choice models under
uncertainty. They are risk aversion, loss aversion, and loss aversion with probability weight-
ing. Brief descriptions of the models follow. (See the appendix for further details of the loss
aversion model and of the discrete-choice framework applied to our experimental setting.)
Risk aversion. The rst model we consider simply relaxes the assumption of risk neu-
trality. In the risk aversion model, subjects are assumed to have a constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility function: u() = (1 r) = (1  r), where  is the disposable income
(i.e., after-tax income) and r is the CRRA coe¢ cient. This model o¤ers the possibility of
explicitly testing the assumption of risk neutrality. If the estimated r is signicantly di¤erent
from zero, then the null hypothesis that subjects are risk neutral can be rejected. We have
also considered alternative utility forms such as constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and
power-expo. There is little change in the goodness of t to the data.
Loss aversion. While the observed compliance behavior can be explained by risk attitude,
it is also consistent with the notion of loss aversion. Recent research has shown that loss
aversion provides a much better account of tax evasion both in the lab and in the eld (see,
e.g., El¤ers and Hessing (1997), Yaniv (1999), King and She¤rin (2002), and Dhami and Al
Nowaihi (2007, 2010)). The loss aversion model characterizes individuals as loss-averse in
terms of the disposable income relative to some reference income. For a given amount of such
relative income x > 0 and a value function v(x), losses are weighted more than gains, i.e.,
j   v( x)j > v(x). We consider Tversky and Kahneman (1992)s specication of the value
function: v(x) = x if x  0, and v(x) =  ( x) if x < 0. The  and  are the parameters
determining the curvature of the function, and  is the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. Subjects
are considered loss-averse if  > 1.9
9Given a xed payo¤ structure, data from the tax compliance game alone contain only two moments
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Loss aversion with probability weighting. Besides the value function, subjects could also
have a nonlinear transformation of the probability scale. For example, Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) nd that people overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high probabil-
ities. To examine the e¤ect of subjective probability weighting, we also estimate a model of
loss aversion with probability weighting. In particular, we consider a popular form of the
one-parameter probability-weighting function: w() = =( + (1  )), where  is a prob-
ability and   0 is the weighting parameter. Note that if  < 1, the weighting function has
an inverted-S shape, which is concave for low probabilities and convex for high probabilities,
and crosses the diagonal at the probability of 1/3.
E¤ectively speaking, H-type players reporting decision is like choosing between a safe
option (honest reporting) and a risky lottery (underreporting), with known, constant prob-
abilities in the Flat-rate treatment but unknown, endogenous probabilities in the Bounded
treatment. Thus, the reporting choice in the Bounded treatment is a¤ected by the subjects
perceived average audit probability, denoted by ba. Our analyses let us infer an estimate of ba.
With the estimate, we can answer the following questions: What average audit probability of
a at-rate rule would induce the same level of compliance as observed in the Bounded treat-
ment? Moreover, how do risk aversion, loss aversion, and probability weighting inuence the
subjectsperception of the average audit probability in the Bounded treatment?
4.3 Additional Result
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the three models based on the Flat-rate and Bounded
treatments. All coe¢ cient estimates of the models are highly signicant (at the 1% level),
suggesting that all of them are useful in explaining the compliance levels observed in the
treatments. For instance, the risk aversion specication suggests that subjects are risk averse
in both treatments, as the CRRA coe¢ cient r is signicantly larger than zero. It indicates
that risk aversion helps in explaining the data. The perceived audit probability in the
Bounded treatment is 0.336. In other words, a at-rate rule with an audit probability of
(i.e., the percentages of subjects selecting the risky lottery in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments).
They lack su¢ cient identication power to estimate three parameters jointly. Therefore, we pool together
the data from the risk elicitation task and the tax compliance game to jointly estimate the parameters.
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0.336, rather than 0.4, would induce such risk-averse subjects to comply at a level similar to
what has been observed in the Bounded treatment.
Results of the loss aversion specication suggest that subjects are loss-averse. The esti-
mated coe¢ cient of loss aversion  is larger than 1 in both treatments, which means that
subjects are more sensitive to a loss than a gain of the same magnitude. The estimated slope
coe¢ cients of the value function indicate concavity in the gain domain () and convexity in
the loss domain (). Moreover, a Vuong test on non-nested models favors the loss aversion
model over the risk aversion model (p < 0:05). For loss-averse subjects, a at-rate rule with
an audit probability of 0.306 would induce the same compliance level as observed in the
Bounded treatment.
The third specication combines loss aversion with probability weighting. We nd that
this specication does not improve the goodness of t signicantly. Moreover, the probability-
weighting parameter  is not signicantly di¤erent from 1 for both treatments (p = 0:438 and
0:397 for Flat-rate and Bounded, respectively). So the subjectively weighted probabilities
used by the subjects on average are in line with the objective probabilities. Overall, the
results suggest that what drives the observed compliance level is likely to be the way the
subjects view losses and gains, rather than how they assess probabilities.
Figure 3 displays the predicted underreporting rates based on di¤erent models and the
actual rates observed in the treatments. Because probability weighting adds little to the
loss aversion model, the predicted underreporting rate of this model is based on coe¢ cients
estimated without probability weighting. The compliance behaviors in our experiment are
best explained by the loss aversion model, compared to the alternatives, namely the risk
aversion model and the standard theory with perfectly rational, risk-neutral players (with
and without correction for seemingly intrinsically honest subjects). We conclude this section
with the following result.
Result 4 The compliance levels observed in the Flat-rate and Bounded treatments can be
satisfactorily explained by a loss aversion model under the discrete-choice framework.
The additional analyses in this section solve the otherwise unexplained levels of compliance
observed in the experiment. Throughout the process, we do not nd anything that might
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compromise the conclusion from our main analysis.
5 Relation to Tax Compliance Literature
IRS has the practice of disclosing only broad statistics such as the audit rate of each income
class. In line with this, many tax compliance studies consider settings where taxpayers are
told to be audited independently at a known, constant probability (see literature reviews by
Andreoni et al. (1998), Alm and McKee (1998), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002)). Such a
setting is captured by the Flat-rate treatment in our experiment.
In the vast majority of tax compliance studies, the attention is on the interaction between
the auditor and a taxpayer, without considering the interaction with the whole taxpayer
population, or the interactions among taxpayers. A notable exception is Alm and McKee
(2004), who experimentally study a DIFrule that represents IRSs audit policy based on
discriminant function (DIF) scores. The audit probability of their DIFrule depends on
the deviation of an individuals reported income from the average of the incomes reported
by all other players. This audit rule induces a coordination problem for taxpayers who want
to cheat on taxes. In their experiment, all participants receive the same level of income in
any given period. This is not the case in our experiment. Besides this distinction leading
to a di¤erent coordination problem in the Bounded treatment, another di¤erence is that
the interaction induced by the bounded rule among taxpayers does not always lead to a
coordination game.
Tax compliance studies rarely explicitly consider audit budget. Unlike others, Yim (2009)
emphasizes the importance of the budget commitment required to support an audit policy
and the implication to the structure of the policy. Using a setting similar to the classic
tax compliance game (Graetz et al. (1986)), he shows that the equilibrium audit policy
that minimizes the required committed budget takes the form of the bounded rule. Such a
binary-income setting, or similar discrete-type extensions, have been used in many studies
(e.g., Mills et al. (2010), Mills and Sansing (2000), and some others cited in footnote 4 of
Yim (2009)).
Though stylized, the binary-income setting captures some salient features of audit se-
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lection in reality. For example, low-income taxpayers in the setting have no incentive to
submit high-incomereports. So these reports must have been submitted by high-income
taxpayers. Because auditing such reports cannot lead to higher tax revenue, these reports
are not audited under either of the audit rules considered in our experiment. Indeed, the
IRM prescribes that [c]lassiers [who review computer-prescreened tax returns to determine
which are to be put forth for examination (i.e., audit)] should compare the potential benets
to be derived from examining a return to the resources required to perform the examination.
Although you may identify some potentially good issues on the return, if they would not
yield a signicant adjustment, the return should be accepted as led.(emphasis added) (see
paragraph 1 of IRM 4.1.5.1.5.1.1 (10-24-2006) in Section 5 Classication and Case Build-
ing of the manual). In line with this, a recent study by Phillips (2010) shows that IRS
focuses on auditing taxpayers expected to have high unmatched income (i.e., income cannot
be cross-checked with third-party reports such as Form W-2) and rarely examines taxpayers
likely to have only matched income.
Besides Yim (2009), Erard and Feinstein (1994) also explicitly consider audit budget.
However, like other tax compliance studies, they focus on the interaction between the auditor
and an atomic taxpayer in the population. This e¤ectively reduces the whole taxpayer
population into a representative taxpayer. The complexity of the model gives rise to the
characterization of the equilibrium by a second-order di¤erential equation The equation
does not have a closed-form solution and hence can only be solved numerically. In contrast,
the setting of the classic tax compliance game is much simpler. Morever, the bounded rule
that constitutes an equilibrium audit strategy has a simple structure determined by the audit
capacity constraint.
Indeed, audit capacity is an important concern in IRSs operations. Guidelines in the
IRM suggest that a subtantial part of the agencys operations is done at the District O¢ ce
level, referred to as [geographical] Areain the manual. The audit capacity of each District
O¢ ce, namely the sta¤ force constituting mainly of revenue agents, tax compliance o¢ cers,
return classiers, etc (referred to as posts-of-duty (POD) in the manual), is determined
based on the approved national examination plan constrained by resources requested in the
Congressional Budget (see IRM 4.1.1.2 (10-24-2006) Examination Plan).
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Besides audit capacity, the bounded rule or the binary-income setting has other stylized
features resembling IRSs audit policy. To point out the similarity, it is useful to begin
with a quick overview of the audit selection procedure in reality. According to the IRM,
tax returns are rst computer-scored using the DIF System (see IRM 4.1.3.2 (10-24-2006)
DIF Overview). Then with the national minimum cuto¤ score determined by National
Headquarters each year, returns above the cuto¤ are added to the DIF inventory (see IRM
4.1.1.3 (10-24-2006) Minimum DIF Cuto¤ Score).
Alm and McKee (2004) have studied a DIFrule that triggers an audit to a taxpayer
based on the deviation between his or her reported income and the average reported income
in an experiment session. Anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that what matters most
is not the reported income of a return relative to othersaverage. [T]ax professionals, who
are familiar with I.R.S. procedures, say that the [DIF] formula examines the relationships
between those income and deduction items that the I.R.S. has found to be the best indicators
of compliance, chiseling and cheating. (Johnston (1996)). In line with this, a statistics
professor Aczel (1994) has used a supercomputer and modern statistical techniques like
logistic regression or classication and regression trees to determine which kinds of returns
get audited(Johnston (1996)) and found that taxpayers whose Schedule A deductions are
less than 35 percent of income are almost never audited, while those who deduct 44 percent
or more of income are almost certain to be audited. Those who fall in between those gures
are at risk of being audited, depending on which type of deductions they take.(Johnston
(1995a)).
Thus, whether certain deduction items have been claimed and their amounts relative to
the reported income of the return seems to be most important. A return would have little
chance to be added to the DIF inventory if suspiciousdeduction items were not claimed.
The red-ag nature of claiming suspicious deduction items is similar to the pooling of
low-incomereports by lying taxpayers with those by honest low-income taxpayers in the
binary-income setting of the experiment.
Not every return added to the central DIF inventory will eventually be audited. To
be selected for audit, a return must rst be among those ordered by a relevant Area for
classication into accepted as led or selected for examination (i.e., audit) (see IRM 4.1.5.1.3
20
Wi
th
r w
n b
y t
he
 au
tho
r
You can find a newer version here: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31160/
(10-24-2006) Sorting of Classied Returns). Areas might have di¤erent selection rates for
a variety of reasons (e.g., local issues, classiersjudgment, etc). Therefore, to meet the audit
target of an Area in the Examination Plan, [t]he PSP [(i.e., Planning and Special Programs
Territory Manager)] will calculate the Area DIF cuto¤ score ... giving consideration to the
selection rate. (see IRM 4.1.1.3.1 (10-24-2006) DIF Cuto¤ Score). With the Area DIF
cuto¤, returns of an Area are divided into two groups: above-cuto¤ returns (analogous to the
low-incomereports in the experiment) and below-cuto¤ (analogous to the high-income
reports).
Areas order returns from the cerntral DIF inventory based on their specic cuto¤s. After
classication, returns selected for audit are catergorized into Field Examination(i.e., visits
at taxpayerssites) or O¢ ce Examination(i.e., interviews at IRS o¢ ces) (see IRM 4.1.5.1.3
(10-24-2006) Sorting of Classied Returns). The returns are added to the Examination
inventory (see IRM 4.1.1.6.3 (10-24-2006) Inventory Monitoring). Later the audits of these
returns are assigned to PODs (i.e., revenue agents, tax compliance o¢ cers, etc) based on
ZIP codes [on the returns] using the ZIP/POD Lookup Table(see IRM 4.1.1.7 (10-24-2006)
ZIP/POD Tables).
The IRM has guidelines to regulate the ow of orders in accordance with the Examina-
tion Plan. A POD Supplement Order is allowed as an exception if there is a workload
shortage at a specic POD (see IRM 4.1.3.4 (10-24-2006) Guidelines for Ordering Re-
turns). Nonetheless, the IRM species that if such orders result in the delivery of returns
that are below the [Area] DIF cuto¤ score, not more than 10% of the returns ordered
for any POD should be below the DIF cuto¤ score.(see IRM 4.1.1.3.2 (10-24-2006) Use
of DIF Cuto¤ Score for Return Orders). In other words, aside from the 10% exibility, a
POD is not permitted to audit below-cuto¤ returns even when the POD has audited all the
above-cuto¤ returns assigned to it, with idle capacity to audit more. This feature is similar
to the key characteristic of the bounded rule: audit as many as possible if the number of
suspicious reports exceeds the given capacity, or otherwise audit all such reports but none
of the unsuspicious despite under-utilized capacity.
Because of the simple setting, the similarity with key features of the reality, and the
theoretical equivalence to the at-rate rules deterrence e¤ect, we use the bounded rule to
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represent the underlying audit policy of a tax athority that discloses merely the average
audit probability to taxpayers.
6 Concluding Remarks
Tax authorities around the world often are reluctant to disclose audit policy details.10 In
particular, the US IRS has the practice of releasing broad statistics like the audit rate of each
income class but opposes pressures demanding details on how di¤erent circumstances might
result in a higher audit probability to taxpayers. In this paper, we ask whether the potential
adverse impact on tax compliance could be a serious concern justifying the reluctance of tax
authorities like IRS to disclose audit policy details.
To answer the question, we carefully consider the theoretical deterrence-equivalence of two
audit rules and the documentedWPPT puzzle in designing the treatments of our experiment.
In the Flat-rate treatment, participants are told that they independently face a known audit
probability. By constrast, participants in the Bounded treatment are fully informed of the
contingent audit probability structure. We rst show that according to the standard theory,
participants should have a su¢ ciently strong incentive to lie about their income, regardless
of the treatments. Based on this theoretical prediction that is consistent with the WPPT
puzzle, we develop the hypothesis for testing.
Our ndings show that consistent with the WPPT puzzle, the observed compliance lev-
els are substantially higher than the theoretically predicted levels. Most important, the
compliance levels of the two treatments that represent merely disclosing the average audit
probability versus fully disclosing the audit policy details are not signicantly di¤erent. This
main result supports our hypothesis, suggesting that disclosing audit policy details do not
necessarily reduce tax compliance. The examination with a third treatment to assess the
sensitivity of our results to the existence of multiple equilibria suggests that disclosing audit
policy details can increase, rather than reduce tax compliance.
We check two things to ensure that behaviors observed in the experiment are consistent
10[M]ost [tax] agencies undertake substantial precautions to maintain the secrecy of their audit selection
procedures.(Andreoni et al. (1998)). See OECD (2004) for an overview of various countriesaudit selection
systems.
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with what we know from theories, and hence our main results are not compromised by
anything that we could not explain. First, we verify that the audit budget implications
of the observed behaviors are broadly consistent with the theoretical insights of the study
where the equivalence between the bounded and at-rate rules was derived. Then we use
alternative choice models under uncertainty to explain the observed compliance levels under-
predicted by the standard theory. Results from these exercises conrm what we know from
theories. We therefore believe that our main result is not a¤ected by some unknown factor.
Obviously, the evidence collected from one experiment cannot constitute a strong ground
for tax authorities (sharing IRSs concern) to change their disclosure practices. Nevertheless,
given the trend in increasingly stronger demand for government transparency, the evidence
from this experiment does provide a reasonable basis for tax authorities to be more open-
minded in viewing the issue. Compared to IRS, some agencies in other countries appear
to be more liberal and transparent (see, e.g., Canada Revenue Agency and Australian Tax
O¢ ce discussed in Hasseldine (2007) and Leviner (2008)). However, unless tax authorities let
researchers examine more accurately and thoroughly the impacts of disclosing audit policy
details, no one can tell what level of disclosure is best for society.
Let us re-iterate our suggestion already made in the introduction: IRS can set out a
plan to disclose on a properly selected date of each year more information about the audit
policy. This way researchers can precisely analyze the impact of the incremental information
disclosure. Furher evidence can thus be provided to determine whether even more disclosure
or IRSs current position of information withholding should be supported.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of underreporting rate over 30 periods
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Figure 2: Frequency distributions of individual underreporting rate
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Figure 3: Model predictions of underreporting rate versus actual observations
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Table 1: Experimental treatments
Treatment High-income Audit probability a Number of
probability q or capacity K subjects
Flat-rate 0.5 a = 0:4 64
Bounded 0.5 K = 2 64
Bounded-hi-q 0.9 K = 2 64
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Table 2: Summary statistics of treatments
All 30 Periods Last 10 Periods
Flat-rate Bounded Bounded-hi-q Flat-rate Bounded Bounded-hi-q
All subjects
High-income frequency 0.514
(0.007)
0.491
(0.039)
0.898
(0.024)
0.527
(0.042)
0.519
(0.038)
0.908
(0.013)
Percentage of
low-incomereports
79.74%
(0.074)
78.85%
(0.015)
40.31%
(0.053)
77.97%
(0.066)
75.94%
(0.018)
32.97%
(0.055)
H-type subjects
Underreporting rate 60.83%
(0.144)
57.11%
(0.049)
33.95%
(0.038)
58.16%
(0.143)
53.32%
(0.052)
26.16%
(0.046)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p = 0.386 p = 0.564
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Auditing statistics
Cheater detection rate 38.76%
(0.065)
33.13%
(0.043)
73.27%
(0.025)
42.08%
(0.107)
31.88%
(0.125)
70.97%
(0.105)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p = 0.113 p = 0.149
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Total no. of audits 153.8
(18.14)
120
(0.000)
114.8
(4.500)
53.75
(8.098)
40
(0.000)
37
(2.160)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Avg. no. of audits
(per group per period)
2.56
(0.300)
2
(0.000)
1.91
(0.065)
2.69
(0.414)
2
(0.000)
1.85
(0.093)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Audit selection rate 40.16%
(0.030)
31.71%
(0.006)
59.99%
(0.062)
42.96%
(0.038)
32.94%
(0.007)
71.31%
(0.095)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Budget usage ratio 32.03%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
95.63%
(0.032)
32.09%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
92.54%
(0.033)
Bounded v. Flat-rate p < 0.05 p < 0.05
Bounded -hi-q v. Bounded p < 0.05 p < 0.05
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Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses. Statistical testing on the treatement e¤ects is based on
the two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, with each session constituting an independent observation. High-
income frequency is the actual frequency of the subjects being assigned as a high-income taxpayer in a
treatment. Percentage of low-incomereports is the total number of low-incomereports received divided
by 8, regardless of whether the reports are submitted by genuine low-income taxpayers or lying high-income
taxpayers. Underreporting rate is the percentage of times where subjects when assigned as a high-income
taxpayer submit a low-incomereport. Cheater detection rate is the frequency that a tax cheater is caught
during an audit stage. Audit selection rate is the proportion of low-incomereports selected for audit, out
of the total number of such reports received. Budget usage ratio is the percentage of audit resources actually
used, out of the budget commitment required to credibly support an audit rule.
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Table 3: Estimation of choice models under uncertainty
Risk aversion Loss aversion
Loss aversion with
Prob. Weighting
Flat-rate Bounded Flat-rate Bounded Flat-rate Bounded
CRRA coe¢ cient r
0.366
(0.350)
0.594
(0.055)
Gain domain curvature 
0.445
(0.034)
0.428
(0.038)
0.640
(0.459)
0.533
(0.075)
Loss domain curvature 
0.548
(0.052)
0.708
(0.030)
0.586
(0.068)
0.858
(0.073)
Loss aversion coe¢ cient 
1.100
(0.802)
1.148
(0.030)
1.674
(0.123)
1.283
(0.171)
Weighting parameter 
1.150
(0.193)
0.899
(0.120)
Perceived audit prob. ba 0.336
(0.017)
0.305
(0.007)
0.240
(0.023)
Log-likelihood -1163.773 -1087.292 -1141.710 -1082.473 -1141.353 -1082.111
Observations 2331 2287 2331 2287 2331 2287
Note: All coe¢ cient estimates in this table are statistically signicant at the 1% level. To account for
within-group correlation, the standard errors are clustered by individual. The risk aversion specication is
based on a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function: u() = (1 r)=(1  r), where  is
the disposable income (i.e., after-tax income) and r is the CRRA coe¢ cient. The loss aversion
specication is based on Tversky and Kahneman (1992)s specication of the value function: v(x) = x if
x  0, and v(x) =  ( x) if x < 0, where  and  are the parameters determining the curvature of
the function in the gain and loss domains, respectively, and  is the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. The loss
aversion with probability weighting specication is based on a popular one-parameter probability-weighting
function: w() = =(+(1  )), where  is a probability and   0 is the weighting parameter.
The perceived audit probability ba is the audit probability of a at-rate rule that would induce the same
level of compliance as observed in the Bounded treatment.
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Appendix
A Theoretical Analysis
A.1 Model Setup
The theoretical model setup underlying our experiment is similar to that in Yim (2009). He
derived the bounded rule using the classic tax compliance game setting. A comparison of our
setup with Yims is provided at the end of this section. Below we rst describe the model
setup and then explain the predictions in di¤erent treatments of the experiment.
Consider a taxpayer population of a given income class of size N . For simplicity, we
assume two income levels: high and low, denoted by IH and IL, respectively, where IL < IH.
Each taxpayer has a probability q of having a high income (H-type) and 1  q of low income
(L-type), where 0 < q < 1. Taxpayers know the type distribution as well as their own types,
but they do not know the types of the others. Each taxpayer has to decide simultaneously
and privately whether to report a high incomeor low incometo the tax authority. Let
TH and TL be the tax payments for taxpayers ling high-incomeand low-incomereports,
respectively, where TH < IH, TL < IL, and TL < TH. If cheaters are audited, they will be
caught with a ne F > 0 imposed on top of the tax they need to pay. Taxpayers who
report truthfully are assumed to incur no cost if they are audited. The theoretical analysis
in this section is based on the simplest setting with perfectly rational, risk-neutral taxpayers
maximizing the disposable income (i.e., after tax and ne, if applicable).
Flat-rate rule. Any taxpayer ling a low-incomereport will independently face a at
audit probability aFR. Since reporting truthfully does not incur any cost when being audited,
L-type players always report their income truthfully. If they report a high income, the
report will not be audited. They will be taxed TH, which is larger than the tax TL on
a honestly reported income. For H-type players, the honest-reporting payo¤ is IH   TH.
Underreporting gives them a payo¤ of IH   TL if they are not audited, and IH   TH   F if
they are audited. Therefore, underreporting is an optimal choice when the expected payo¤
from it is larger than the payo¤ from honest reporting:
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(1  aFR)(IH   TL) + aFR(IH   TH   F ) > (IH   TH):
That is to say, H-type players will underreport if the audit probability is less than the
threshold a dened below
a = (TH   TL)=(F + TH   TL);
otherwise, honest reporting is an optimal choice.
Owing to its coin-ipping nature, the at-rate rule cannot be credibly implemented
unless the auditor has a budget commitment to be ready to audit N low-incomereports,
if indeed received. In contrast, the bounded rule described below is characterized by an audit
capacity K < N .
Bounded rule. This rule, like the at-rate rule, never audits high-incomereports. Let
L denote the number of low-incomereports received by the auditor. If L is smaller than
or equal to the audit capacity K, the auditor will audit all L reports. However, if L is larger
than K, the auditor will randomly audit K of the reports. Consequently, a taxpayer ling a
low-incomereport faces a contingent audit probability under the bounded rule:
aBD =
8<: 1 if L  KK=L if L > K for L = 0; 1; :::N:
A key feature of the bounded rule is that the audit probability aBD is no longer exogenously
given. Instead, it depends on the audit capacityK and the number L of low-incomereports
submitted. The latter is a¤ected by the population size N and the ex-ante probability q of
a taxpayer having a high income.The following proposition characterizes an important
property of the bounded rule.
Proposition 1 For any given N and q, the auditor can always choose an audit capacity
K for the bounded rule such that it induces the same compliance level as the at-rate rule.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. Any audit probability aFR under the at-rate
rule induces all-or-none compliance behavior. If the maximum number ofK is so high that all
low-incomereports will always be audited for sure, H-type players will have no incentive to
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underreport. On the other hand, if K is zero (meaning that no audit is conducted regardless
of the number of low-income reports submitted), then H-type players will underreport
with certainty. Between these two extreme cases there exists a threshold K such that any
K > K sustains compliance behavior regardless of the actual income-realization parameter
q. That is, even in the scenario where all taxpayers le low income reports, the audit
probability is still high enough to deter tax evasion.
To induce full compliance, however, the committed budget K does not always need to be
larger than K. Put it di¤erently, even when K < K, the bounded rule is still able to induce
full compliance. Depending on the parameters, the interactions among taxpayers induced by
the bounded rule could either be a dominance-solvable game with one unique equilibrium,
or a coordination game with multiple equilibria. We construct two treatments to empirically
examine the deterrence e¤ect of the bounded rule under each situation.
A.2 Predictions in Treatments
In this study, the deterrence e¤ect is indicated by the underreporting rate in the population:
namely, the proportion of high-income taxpayers ling low-income reports in a certain
period. As discussed in Section A.1, L-type players have a dominant strategy of reporting
honestly, regardless of the audit rules.11 Therefore, our analysis focuses on H-type players.
In the following, let h denote the honest-reporting choice of a H-type player, and u the
underreporting choice.
Flat-rate: In this treatment with q = 0:5, the audit probability aFR is set at 0.4. Given
this, an underreporting decision is equivalent to selecting a lottery of e22.5 with probability
0.6 and e2.5 with probability 0.4. The expected payo¤ therefore is: E(u) = e22:5 0:6 +
e2:50:4 = e14:5, which is larger than the sure payo¤e12.5 from honest reporting. Hence,
H-type players are expected to underreport.
Bounded: In this treatment (also with q = 0:5), H-type players again face the tax-
evasion gamble of choosing between a sure payo¤ of e12.5 versus a risky lottery with a high
payo¤ of e22.5 if not audited but a low payo¤ of e2.5 otherwise. Unlike the at-rate rule,
11The actual percentage of honest reports among L-type taxpayers are 99.68% and 99.28% across treat-
ments, suggesting that they do play the dominant strategy.
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however, the audit probability aBD is not exogenously given. Instead, it depends on the
audit capacity K set at 2 and the playersperceptions about otherschoices. In particular,
the audit probability perceived by player i is a¤ected by her/his subjective belief about how
likely a low-incomereport is submitted by another player.
A low-income report could come from two sources. The rst source is from a truth-
telling L-type player with probability 1 q. Alternatively, it could come from H-type players
who dishonestly report that they have received a low income.If a player thinks that the
underreporting probability of H-type players i is bi, this scenario will occur with probability
qbi. Hence, the overall probability Bi of receiving a low-incomereport from player i is the
sum of the probabilities in these two situations: Bi = 1  q + qbi.
The Nash equilibrium in the Bounded treatment can be solved by iterated elimination
of dominated strategies. The intuition is as follows. Reporting high income is a dominated
strategy for L-type players, since they have to pay a high tax and incur a lower payo¤ than
they would otherwise. If the H-type players believe that the L-type obey dominance, then the
strategy of reporting truthfully (h) is dominated. That is, even when a H-type player believes
that no other players evade taxes, the expected payo¤ of underreporting is still higher than
that of honest reporting. Such a high expected payo¤ is caused by a low audit probability
strictly less than 0.5, which stems from the fact that all of the L-type players (about half of
the population) reports a low incometruthfully. The calculation guarantees that evading
taxes is always a best response for a H-type player when L-type players obey dominance.
Proposition 2 stated below provides the theoretical foundation for our hypothesis for testing.
Proposition 2 With q = 0:5, the game induced by the bounded rule with K = 2 is
dominance-solvable. In equilibrium, both L-type and H-type taxpayers submit low income
reports.
Bounded-hi-q: In this treatment with q = 0:9, the bounded rule with K = 2 changes the
interaction among taxpayers into a coordination game. We focus on the symmetric equilibria
because asymmetric equilibria, though exist in this setting, require unrealistic coordination
among the ex ante homogenous players.
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Proposition 3 With q = 0:9, the game induced by the bounded rule with K = 2 has two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In the pure-strategy
equilibria, L-type taxpayers play their dominant strategy of honest reporting. Moreover, all
H-type taxpayers opt for underreporting if they believe other H-type taxpayers each cheat with
a probability higher than 0:432; otherwise, they all opt for honest reporting. A symmetric
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium also exists, with H-type taxpayers each underreporting with
probability 0:432 and honestly reporting with the complementary probability.
Now consider that some players are intrinsically honest. They report their income truth-
fully, regardless of their income type. This assumption does not change the treatment di¤er-
ences, as long as the percentage of intrinsically honest players is identical in both treatments.
Recall that in the Bounded treatment, the optimal strategy of the H-type players does not
depend on their beliefs towards other H-type players. As long as they believe that L-types
will not play dominated strategy (i.e. reporting a high income), they can form expectations
on the proportion of low-incomereports submitted to the auditor. Given that the ex-ante
probability of being a L-type player is su¢ ciently high (q = 0:5), the sure payo¤ for a H-type
player from reporting honestly is lower than the expected payo¤ from underreporting, even
when s/he does not expect any other H-types to underreport. This ensures that all H-type
players in the Bounded treatment will continue to underreport with or without intrinsically
honest players. In the Flat-rate treatment, players make decisions independently. The audit
probability facing a taxpayer is not inuenced by the existence of intrinsically honest players.
In sum, if the percentage of intrinsically honest players is assumed to be the same in both
treatments, the treatment di¤erence in the underreporting rate is una¤ected.
In the Bounded-hi-q treatment, suppose that each taxpayer has a known probability 
of being an intrinsically honest player. If  is su¢ ciently large, strategic players will nd
underreporting too risky to be worth the attempt. If that is the case, this modication could
be considered as a renement of the coordination game. However, if  is small, the payo¤-
dominant Nash equilibrium still exists, provided that a strategic player has a strong belief in
the noncompliance behavior of other strategic players. We nd that (seemingly) intrinsically
honest players consist of 15% of all subjects in the Flat-rate treatment. Assuming strategic
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players correctly anticipate that  = 0:15, the threshold belief inducing underreporting
behavior changes from 0:432 to 0:508. Nonetheless, the two pure-strategy equilibria remain
the same.
A.3 Relation to Yim (2009)
In Yim (2009), the auditor interacts strategically with taxpayers by choosing an audit capac-
ity without openly committing to it before taxpayers making reporting choices. Therefore,
like the classic tax compliance game, deterministic underreporting by all H-type taxpayers
cannot constitute an equilibrium.
In theory, we can structure the parameters of the two audit rules such that in equilib-
rium the induced compliance levels are identical, and then we design a fully-strategic game
experiment accordingly. However, this requires a demanding understanding about the game
and a mutual belief towards each others choice. Any o¤-equilibrium decisions by subjects
taking the auditor role will have unpredictable impacts on others taking the taxpayer role,
leading to unmanageable complications in comparing the treatment results.
Considering such complications, we let the auditor commit to an audit rule and focus on
taxpayersreactions. Therefore, our experiment is not a direct test of Yims model. Instead,
we regard our examination of the budget implications of the audit rules as a simple check on
the robustness of the theoretical insights, i.e., to see whether they still largely hold outside
the original setting where the bounded rule was derived.
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B Technical Details and Proofs
B.1 Technical Details: Discrete-choice Framework and Loss Aver-
sion Models
Discrete-choice framework applied to the experimental setting. According to the discrete-
choice framework, H-type players will choose to underreport if and only if the di¤erence in
the expected utilities is su¢ ciently large to exceed a stochastic error denoted by ". Formally,
this is expressed as
EU(u)  EU(h) > ".
where u and h denote the disposable income from underreporting and honest reporting,
respectively. The stochastic error " is commonly assumed to be independently and identically
distributed across players and actions with a Type 1 extreme value (i.e., logit) distribution.
The error can come from many sources, including the inability to calculate the expected
payo¤ or trembling hands during decision making.
Because expected utility is unique up to an a¢ ne transformation, a standard result of
the discrete-choice framework is that under the error distributional assumptions above, the
underreporting probability bb is given as follows:
bb = PrfEU(u)  EU(h) > "g
=
1
1 + exp[ (EU(u)  EU(h))=] , (1)
where  > 0 representing the sensitivity of a subjects reporting choice to the relative
payo¤s of the two choices. When  approaches innity, players choose underreporting and
honest reporting with equal probability, independent of the relative expected payo¤s. As 
decreases, players put less probability weight on choices that yield suboptimal payo¤s. When
 approaches 0; the probability of their selecting the optimal choice converges to 1. Simply
put,  reects the magnitude of the measurement error when subjects calculate expected
utilities from underreporting and honest reporting.
Our baseline specication assumes risk-neutral players, i.e., U() = . So for this speci-
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cation, the conditional log-likelihood function used for estimation is as follows:
lnL=
X
i;t

yit ln

1
1 + exp[(E(h)  E(u))=]

+(1  yit) ln

exp[(E(h)  E(u))=]
1 + exp[(E(h)  E(u))=]

;
where
E(u) =
8<: 0:6 22:5 + 0:4 2:5 for the Flat-rate treatment(1  ba) 22:5 + ba 2:5 for the Bounded treatment,
yi;t 2 f0; 1g indicates whether subject i underreports (1) or honestly reports (0) in the
tax compliance game in period t, and ba is the perceived audit probability estimated jointly
with . For the other models, we change the specication of E() accordingly to t the
assumption of risk aversion, or loss aversion, with and without probabilitly weighting.
Loss aversion with and without probability weighting. We follow Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007, 2010) to use the true disposable income as the reference income R = IH   TH. With
this reference point, we dene the relative income as
x =
8<: IH   TH   F  R if caught.IH   TL  R if not caught.
The rationale for dening the relative income this way is as follows. If the reference income
was specied di¤erently, say, using the initial income or the income after cheating detection,
taxpayers would always be in the domain of losses or in the domain of gains. Hence, the
asymmetry of losses and gains cannot a¤ect their behaviors, and the loss aversion model
would fall back into some kind of expected-utility framework. Such a framework is referred
to as rank-dependent expected utility theory. It may be seen as the expected utility theory
applied with a transformed cumulative probability distribution (see Dhami and al-Nowaihi
2007 for more details).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let K = [aN ], as K needs to be an integer. Thus, aBD = minf1; K=Lg = minf1; [aN ]=Lg.
Since L 6 N , aBD > a. That means, in the scenario where all players declare low income, the
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audit probability aBD is equal to a. The H-type players are indi¤erent between the decisions
of underreporting and reporting honestly. If K > K , that means the lowest probability
of being audited is strictly larger than a. Hence, any K > K is su¢ cient to support full
compliance.
The simplest case to induce zero compliance is to set K = 0. Because of zero audit, self-
regarding, prot-maximizing H-type players always report low income, regardless of their
beliefs towards other H-types. More generally, if K < [a], the bounded rule cannot induce
any compliance for strategic players regardless of the income distribution. In other words,
in the worst-case scenario in which only one H-type player claims low income, the audit
probability he or she faces is lower than [a]. Hence, strategic H-type players will underreport.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
This subsection contains two parts. The rst part proves that given all players are rational,
strategic expected prot maximizers, the game introduced by the bounded rule is dominance
solvable. The second part shows that this claim still holds by introducing intrinsically honest
players.
The proof is trivial that reporting high income is a dominated strategy for the L-type
players. To prove that the best response of H-type players is underreporting given that L-
type players comply dominance, the expected payo¤ from underreporting should be strictly
larger than the sure payo¤ from reporting truthfully. Moreover, this holds regardless of the
beliefs that H-type players hold towards the other H-types.
First assume that a H-type player anticipates that no body other than him or her will
underreport. That is, b0 = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1) = (0; 0:; ; ; 0). In this situation, low-income
reports are submitted by L-type. Since the probability of being a L-type is q = 0:5 for every
other player, the probability that exactly n out of N 1 players submit low-incomereports
follows the binomial distribution Bin (n;N   1; q) = Bin (n; 7; 0:5). The expected payo¤
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from underreporting is therefore:
E(ljb0) =
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; q) fmin( 2
n+ 1
; 1) F + [1 min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)] Sg
= S   (S   F )
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; Bi)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
= 22:5  20
7P
n=0
Bin(n; 7; 0:5)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
= 12:698
The sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully is 12:5. Hence, a self-interest, risk neutral H-type
player will underreport.
The remaining proof shows that for any given set of beliefs held by a H-type player, the
expected payo¤ from underreporting is always not less than E(ljb0). Assume that player
N thinks the rst N   1 players underreport with probability b = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1). The
probability that player i submit low-income is Bi = 1   q + qbi = 12(1 + bi). Note that
Bi 2 [12 ; 1]. To facilitate notation, dene an index vector I = (i1; i2; :::i7), with i1 6= i2 6= :::i7.
Each index takes a value from the set f1; 2; :::; 7g. The probability that n out of 7 other
players submit low-incomereports is:
Pr(njb) =
Cs7P
s=1
sQ
j=1
Bij
i7Q
k=s+1
(1 Bik)
The expected payo¤ from underreporting is therefore:
E(ljb) =
N 1P
n=0
Pr(njb) fmin( 2
n+ 1
; 1) F + [1 min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)] Sg
It turns out that for any given bi, @E(l)=@bi = (@E(l)=@Bi)  (@Bi=@bi) > 0.12 This
means that the expected payo¤ from underreporting is increasing in the (subjective) propen-
sity to evade taxes. Hence, given any set of belief b = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1), E(ljb)  E(ljb0).
Hence, the best response of the H-type players is to underreport.
The second part of this subsection proves that the introduction of intrinsically honest
players does not change the directions of treatment di¤erence. Let  be the probability that
12Calculation is available upon request.
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a player is intrinsically honest, and 1    be the probability that a player is a strategic,
self-regarding prot maximizer, where 0   < 1. We do not allow  = 1, since at least
one strategic player is thinking of this problem. In our setting, in particular, the number of
honest players N can be any number from 0 to 7 out of 8 players. We further assume that
the  is the same in both treatments.
To prove the statement, we only need to show that the inclusion of honest players does
not a¤ect the strategy of the prot maximizers. When the strategic players are assigned
to be L-types, they gain a higher payo¤ by reporting truthfully, regardless of the auditing
rule implemented. In the Flat-rate treatment, H-type prot maximizers only compare a
sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully and the expected payo¤ from the tax evasion gamble if
they underreport. Hence, the existence of honest players will not a¤ect their choices. In
the Bounded treatment, the subjective beliefs of strategic, H-type players of the number of
low-incomereports now become: Bi = (1  q) + q(1  )b. Given that q = 0:5, 0   < 1,
B still lies in the interval [1
2
; 1]. Therefore, Proposition 2 still holds.
In the presence of honest players, the non-compliance rate of both treatments becomes:
P
Bin(n;N; q)(1  ) = (1  ) .
B.4 The Existence of Coordination
If this game is a coordination game, there exists an b 2 [0; 1] such that the payo¤ from
underreporting is equal to the honest payo¤:
E(u;N; q;K; bi) =
N 1X
n=0
Bin(n;N   1;Bi) [(1  aBD) (IH   TL) + aBD  (IH   TH   F )]
= IH   TH .
Due to the discrete nature of the distribution, a direct proof is di¢ cult. However, just
for illustration purposes, if N is large, the expected number of low-income reports is
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BiN = [(1  q) + qbi]N . The expected prot from underreporting could be simplied as
E(u) =
K
BiN
(IH   TH   F ) + (1  K
BiN
)(IH   TL)
= IH   TH .
Solving the equation yields Bi = K(TH + F   TL)=N(TH   TL). Hence, there exists a
set of parameters K,TH ,F ,TL, N and q such that Bi 2 (0; 1). Thus, in certain parameter
domains, the H-type players under the bounded rule nd themselves indi¤erent between
underreporting and honestly-reporting if bi = b =
Bi (1 q)
q
. If bi > b, then the H-types all
underreport; if bi < b, then the H-types all report honestly.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Let i(j) be the probability that type i player (H-type or L-type) will use strategy j (u or h).
There are two pure Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in this treatment:
f(H(u) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(h) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(u) = 0:432; L(h) = 1)g.
In words, the two pure Nash equilibria are 1) all H-type players underreport and 2) all H-type
players honestly report. L-type players always honestly report.
Let us examine the former case. Given that a H-type player thinks that all other H-
types choose strategy u, s/he will have an expected payo¤ of 17.5 by playing strategy l.
By deviating to h, the payo¤ decreases to 12.5. Since we assume symmetry among players,
no one has the incentive to deviate from underreporting, which constitutes a NE. A highly
similar analysis applies to the latter case. Given that all other H-type players play strategy
h, a strategy deviation from h to l will yield a lower expected payo¤ for H-type players (from
12.5 to 3.59). Hence, no one has an incentive to deviate.
On top of the two pure equilibria, the game has also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
each H-type player is indi¤erent between the strategy of honest-reporting and underreporting.
Given the game parameters, the underreporting probability b that induces utility indi¤erence
is bSE = 0:432.
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C Instructions
C.1 Instructions Comparison
The instructions given in the next subsection are for the Bounded treatment. These instruc-
tions di¤er from those given for the other treatments as follows:
 Flat-rate treatment
1. The second bullet (concerning matching protocol) of the list under Task Descrip-
tionin the instructions for the Tax Compliance Gameis absent.
2. The Audit Probability Tableis absent.
3. The phrase see audit prob. tablein the Payo¤ Tablebecomes 0.4.
 Bounded-hi-q treatment
1. In the third bullet of the list under Task Description in the instructions for
the Tax Compliance Game, the probability of receiving e25 becomes 0.9, and
accordingly the probability of receiving 10 becomes 0.1.
2. In the Payo¤Table(immediately before Payment Methodin the instructions
for the Tax Compliance Game), the probabilities in the second column become
0.9 and 0.1, respectively.
C.2 Instructions for Bounded Treatment
 Please read these instructions carefully!
 Please do not talk to your neighbours and remain quiet during the entire experiment.
 If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to you to answer it.
 You will receive a show-up fee of e3 for completing all tasks in the experiment, inde-
pendent of your performance.
Task Description
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 This session consists of 30 periods of play; each period is completely independent of
the others.
 Of the participants in the room, two groups of 8 participants will be randomly formed
at the beginning of each period. You will not know the identity of the other players in
your group in any period.
 At the beginning of each period, you will receive a taxable income of either e25 or
e10. The probability of receiving e25 is 0.5; the probability of receiving e10 is 0.5.
 Your task is to report your income to the auditor, which is played by a computer. The
amount that you report is your decision. You can report either e25 or e10, regardless
of your received income.
After-tax Income Determination
Your after-tax income in this period is determined by the following two steps: tax payment
and an audit.
Step One: Tax payment
The tax rate is 50% for those who reported e25 and 25% for those who reported e10.
Suppose the income you received is e25:
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax.
So your after-tax income in this period equals to e25 e12.5 = e12.5.
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So
your after-tax income in this period equals to e25 e2.5 = e22.5.
Suppose the income you received is e10:
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So
your after-tax income in this period equals to e10 e2.5 = e7.5.
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax.
So your after-tax income in this period equals to e10 e12.5 = -e2.5.
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 In sum, the auditor charges tax based on your reported income, instead of your received
income.
Step Two: Audit
The auditor does not know your received income unless your report is audited later .
Auditing procedure:
 If your reported income is e25, it will not be audited. That means what you have
earned in step one (e12.5 or -e2.5) will be your after-tax income (if your received
income is e25 and e10, respectively).
 Regardless of your received income, if your reported income is e10, there is a chance
that your report will be audited. The outcome is as follows:
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is also e10.
Then what you have earned in step one (e7.5) will be your after-tax income, no
matter whether your report is audited or not.
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is e25. If your
report is not audited, you will keep the e22.5 earned in step one; if audited, you
will get e2.5.
Auditing probability:
The number of reports the auditor will audit depends on the number of players reporting
an income of e10 in a group.
- If the number of e10 income reports is equal to two or less, the auditor will audit all of
the e10 reports.
- If the number of e10 income reports is three or more, then two out of such reports will
be randomly selected for audit.
 The Audit Probability Tablebelow shows the audit probabilities for a player who
reported an income of e10.
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Audit Probability Table
Number of e10 reports 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Audit Probability 100% 100% 100% 66:7% 50% 40% 33:3% 28:6% 25%
 The Payo¤ Tablebelow summarizes all of the possible scenarios you may encounter
in one period and the related payo¤s:
Payo¤ Table
Received Probability Reported Audit After-tax Income After-tax Income
Income Income Probability if audited if NOT audited
e25 0:5 e25 0 e12:5 e12:5
e10 see audit prob. table e2:5 e22:5
e10 0:5 e10 see audit prob. table e7:5 e7:5
e25 0  e2:5  e2:5
Payment Method
 At the end of this experiment, one out of 30 periods will be selected to determine your
payo¤ for this task. The computer program will generate a random number from 1
to 30. This number will determine one of the 30 periods. Your performance in that
period determines your payo¤.
 You will be paid based on your after-tax income for the randomly selected period.
 Because each period is equally likely to be selected for payment determination, you
should make your decision in each period as if that period would be selected for pay-
ment.
 Your payo¤ will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment along with your
earnings in the other task(s).
We will now show you what the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
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Period     1 out of 30                                                Remaining time [sec]:  36
Your taxable income is: € 25
        What is the amount of income you report to the auditor?
Your Decision: €10 口
€ 25 口
Report___
In Screen 1, you can decide the amount of income to report to the auditor. Please select
either e10or e25, and conrm your choice by pressing the Reportbutton.
Warning: Before pressing the button, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change
your decision after you have pressed OK.
SCREEN 2
Period       1 out of 30 Remaining time [sec]: 40
                      The results of this period are as follows:
    Income you received: € 25
Income you reported: € 10
    Your after-tax income in this period: €22.5
OK___
Screen 2 is the feedback table you will receive regarding your after-tax income. Your
will nd information on the initial taxable income you received, the income you reported
and your after-tax income in this period.
Click on OK when you nish checking the information.
Note that the purpose of the screen shots is to clarify the procedure, rather than provide
advice about how to act. You should make the decisions that are best for you.
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C.2.1 Risk Elicitation Task13
Task Description
In this task, you are asked to make decisions related to 21 choice pairs. In each choice
pair, you need to select between two lotteries labeled Lottery Aand Lottery B. Please,
take your time and read each choice pair carefully. An example of a typical choice pair is
given below:
Choice Lottery A e5.5 with probability 0.5 or e3.5 with probability 0.5 Your Lottery A 
No.1 Lottery B e9 with probability 0.5 or e0.5 with probability 0.5 choice: Lottery B 
Payment Method
 You need to make choices for all 21 choice pairs. However, only one of the 21 choices
you have made will be chosen for the payo¤ determination of this task. First, the
computer program will generate a random number from 1 to 21. This number will
determine a choice pair. Then, the computer program will simulate the lottery you
have chosen and reveal the outcome on your screen. The outcome of this lottery will
determine your payo¤.
 For example, suppose that the computer program has generated a random number 2.
It will then check what you have selected in choice pair number 2. Suppose that you
have chosen Lottery A in that choice pair. Then the computer program will simulate
Lottery A and reveal your payo¤ (either e5.5 or e3.5). Your payo¤ will be paid out
in cash at the end of the experiment along with your earnings for the other task.
It is important that you fully understand the lottery selection task. Please raise your
hand if you have any questions at this moment.
13The risk elicitation task is conducted after the tax compliance game. However, the subjects do not
know the existence of this task when they were playing the game.
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C.2.2 Post-experimental Questions
Questions on Treatment Manipulation
Please evaluate the following statements with respect to the tax reporting task:14
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion, 5=slightly
agree, 6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly agree
1. The instructions were clearly formulated.
2. I felt that I performed well on the task.
3. I received plenty of time to carry out the task.
4. I was motivated to do well on the task.
5. The task was fun to perform, motivating me to achieve a payo¤ as high as possible.
6. I considered the tax reporting task as fairly complex.
7. My payo¤ is determined not only by my own decision, but also by the decisions of the
other players.
8. When making my decision, I thought about what other players might do.
9. I feel obliged to report the received income in each period.
10. The chance I have received e25 is about 50%.15
Questions on Background Information
Please answer the following survey questions. Your answers will be used for this study
only. Individual data will not be exposed.
1. What is your gender?
14The rst ve questions are used to understand the subjectsperception about the experimental setup
and instructions in general. We do not expect to nd di¤erences across treatments. The last ve questions
focus on capturing di¤erent types of manipulations of the treatments; therefore, we expect to see di¤erences
across manipulations.
15In the Bounded-Hq treatment, the chance should be 90%, instead of 50%.
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2. What is your nationality?
3. How many years have you already studied in economics?
4. Have you ever had a course related to game theory?
5. Have you ever had a part-time job?
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